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Abstract
Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the
upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is
equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in
the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game
system.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In 1953 Fan [3] proved minimax theorems for a function f defined on the product set
X×Y of two arbitrary sets X,Y (not necessary topologized, or linear). That is the equality
min
x∈X maxy∈Y
f (x, y) = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X f (x, y)
✩ Abridged version of this paper was presented in the Research Institute of Mathematics Science, Kyoto
University, August, 2002.
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the above idea on minimax identity, we will constitute a two-person zero-sum dynamic
game for fractional type,
φ(x, y) = f (x, y)
g(x, y)
, (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
Several types of game systems have been discussed and investigated by Lai and
Tanaka in [9–16,21]. See also the related work in [5,17,18,22]. These games involved
n-person noncooperative dynamic systems in various spaces (cf. [9–14,16,22]) and two-
person zero-sum games (see [5,17,18,21]). Recently, many authors investigated fractional
programming; see, for example, [1,2,4,6–8,19,20]. Lai et al. investigated minimax frac-
tional programming in [6–8] and propose that a minimax theory for fractional objective
f (x, y)/g(x, y) could be applied to two-person zero-sum game theory.
Following this approach, we consider a two-person zero-sum dynamic fractional game
in this paper, and investigate an existence theorem for the saddle value function in a frac-
tional game system.
2. Preliminaries
In a two-person zero-sum game, we will investigate whether two persons will attain a
saddle point in the game system, that is we want to find a value function such that the two
persons can obtain an equilibrium point.
A two-person zero-sum dynamic game with a parameter θ at a discrete time n ∈ N ,
denoted briefly by the game (DGPθ ), includes the following seven elements:
(Sn,An,Bn, tn+1, un, vn, θ),
where each element is defined as follows, and for convenience of the mathematical analy-
sis, the assumptions below are made.
(1) Sn is the state space at time n ∈ N , which is assumed to be a separable complete
metrizable Borel space, so that the Borel functions defined on Sn are integrable over
such a space.
(2) An and Bn are, respectively, the action spaces at time n ∈ N for players I and II in
which each player chooses his (or her) actions in the game system. Here An and Bn
are always assumed to be Borel spaces.
(3) {tn+1} is a sequence of transition probabilities from time n to time n+ 1 in the law of
motion for the game system. When the two players have finished their actions at time
n, denoted by HnAnBn, then the system is moved to state Sn+1. Here Hn stands for
the histories up to time n, thus H1 = S1, Hn = S1A1B1S2A2B2 . . . Sn−1An−1Bn−1Sn,
n = 2,3, . . . , and H∞ stands for the set of infinite histories of the game system.
(4) un :HnAnBn → R and vn :HnAnBn → R+ are bounded Borel measurable functions,
and as the time n goes to infinity, they have the limits
lim un = u ∈ R and lim vn = v ∈ R+.
n→∞ n→∞
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⋃∞
n=1 HnAnBn = H∞. Thus functions un
and vn are regarded as functions on H∞ with support on HnAnBn ⊂ H∞ for all n.
(5) θ : S1 → R is a given parameter function on which the loss function of player I at
time n ∈ N is given by T nθ = un − θvn and the gain (loss) function of player II at time
n ∈ N is given by −T nθ . Then the sum of the two values is always zero.
We denote by Fn (respectively, Gn) the set of all universal measurable transition prob-
abilities from history Hn to An (respectively, Bn), and consider the sequence f = {fn}
(respectively, g = {gn}) with fn ∈ Fn (respectively, gn ∈ Gn) for each time n ∈ N .
Let Efn,Egn,Etn+1 denote the conditional expectation operators with respect to fn ∈ Fn,
gn ∈ Gn and tn+1, respectively. Then each pair of strategies f = {fn} and g = {gn}, to-
gether with the law of motion {tn+1}, defines a unique universally measurable transition
probability by
Pfg(·|·) from S1 → A1B1S2A2B2S3 . . .
such that, for two bounded Borel measurable functions un, vn defined on HnAnBn (n ∈ N ),
and for s1 ∈ S1 and h ∈ H∞, we have
E(un,f, g)(s1) =
∫
H∞
un(h)Pfg(dh|s1)
= Ef1Eg1Et2 . . .Efn−1Egn−1EtnEfnEgnun(s1)
and
E(vn,f, g)(s1) =
∫
H∞
vn(h)Pfg(dh|s1)
= Ef1Eg1Et2 . . .Efn−1Egn−1EtnEfnEgnvn(s1).
Under our assumptions, by the dominated convergence theorem and the Fubini theorem,
we infer that, for each s1 ∈ S1, f = {fn} ∈ F and g = {gn} ∈ G, it would have
U(f,g)(s1) = lim
n→∞E(un,f, g)(s1)
= lim
n→∞Ef1Eg1Et2 . . .Efn−1Egn−1EtnEfnEgnun(s1)
= lim
n→∞Eg1Ef1Et2 . . .Egn−1Efn−1EtnEgnEfnun(s1)
and
V (f,g)(s1) = lim
n→∞E(vn,f, g)(s1)
= lim
n→∞Ef1Eg1Et2 . . .Efn−1Egn−1EtnEfnEgnvn(s1)
= lim
n→∞Eg1Ef1Et2 . . .Egn−1Efn−1EtnEgnEfnvn(s1).
Then, for given s1 ∈ S1, f = {fn} ∈ F and g = {gn} ∈ G, we can evaluate the total loss
function
Tθ (f, g)(s1) = lim EfgT nθ (f, g)(s1) = U(f,g)(s1) − θ(s1)V (f,g)(s1),n→∞
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T¯θ (s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ(f, g)(s1),
and the lower value function of the game
T θ (s1) = sup
g∈G
inf
f∈F Tθ (f, g)(s1).
We call the interval [T θ (s1), T¯θ (s1)] the dual gap of (DGPθ ), and say that the game system
has a saddle value function (or shortly, a value function), if
T¯θ (s1) = T θ (s1) = T ∗θ (s1) for s1 ∈ S1.
In this paper, we will consider the fractional dynamic game of the form
W(f,g)(s1) = U(f,g)(s1)
V (f,g)(s1)
,
and investigate the upper value function
θ¯ (s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
W(f,g)(s1)
and the lower value function
θ(s1) = sup
g∈G
inf
f∈F W(f,g)(s1).
Furthermore, it is natural to ask whether a zero duality gap exists in the game system. That
is, under what conditions one can get a common value function for upper value function
and lower value function, that is,
θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1) for s1 ∈ S1.
3. A two-person zero-sum dynamic fractional game
A two-person zero-sum dynamic game with a parameter θ , is defined in Section 2 by
using 7-tuple, and denoted by (DGPθ ). While a two-person zero-sum dynamic fractional
game (DFG), defined by 6-tuple as
(Sn,An,Bn, tn+1, un, vn)
is something more hard to analysis. The reason is caused by the order of players chosen
their strategies in both the numerator and denominator. The outcome/payoff, eventually,
will be uncertainty. Thus we will employ
upper value function θ¯ (s1) = inf
f
sup
g
W(f,g)(s1)
and
lower value function θ(s1) = sup inf
f
W(f,g)(s1)
g
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θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1) (a fixed parameter),
it will play the value function of (DFG). But we will take a parameter θ between θ and θ¯
in which we study the properties of the function Tθ as the gain (loss) function relative to
the game (DGPθ ).
In this game system, all notation and symbols are used as introduced in Section 2. Recall
the state space Sn, a separable complete metrizable Borel space; An and Bn, the action
spaces of players I and II, respectively, at time n ∈ N ; {tn+1} the sequence of transition
probability regarded as the law of motion in the game system; the functions
un :HnAnBn → R and vn :HnAnBn → R+ = (0,∞)
which are bounded Borel measurable, respectively, and letting time n goes to infinity, they
converge to
lim
n→∞un = u ∈ R and limn→∞ vn = v ∈ R
+.
For each s1 ∈ S1, f = {fn} ∈ F and g = {gn} ∈ G, we assume that the limits of expecta-
tions
U(f,g)(s1) = lim
n→∞E(un,f, g)(s1)
and
V (f,g)(s1) = lim
n→∞E(vn,f, g)(s1) > 0
exist, so that the fraction
W(f,g)(s1) = U(f,g)(s1)
V (f,g)(s1)
is well defined. For an initial state s1 ∈ S1, we define, the upper and lower value functions
of the game (DFG) by
θ¯ (s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
W(f,g)(s1)
and
θ(s1) = sup
g∈G
inf
f∈F W(f,g)(s1),
respectively.
Of course θ¯ (s1) θ(s1) for all s1 ∈ S1, and call the interval [θ(s1), θ¯ (s1)] as the duality
gap of the game (DFG).
Definition 3.1. The game (DFG) is said to have a value function if the duality gap is equal
to zero, and we call the common value function the value function
θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1).
Furthermore, if there exists g∗ ∈ G such that
θ¯ (s1) = inf
f∈F sup W(f,g)(s1) = infW(f,g
∗)(s1),
g∈G
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(DFG).
Similarly, if there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that
θ(s1) = sup
g∈G
inf
f∈F W(f,g)(s1) = supg∈GW(f
∗, g)(s1),
then call f ∗ ∈ F a minimizer (of W(f,g)(s1) over f ∈ F for each g ∈ G) of the game
(DFG).
Next, we analyze some relationships between the upper as well as the lower value func-
tions of (DGPθ ) and (DFG). At first, we state some properties for T¯θ (s1) in the following
propositions.
Proposition 3.1.
(1) For two parameter functions θ1(s1) and θ2(s1), if θ1(s1) > θ2(s1) 0, then T¯θ1(s1)
T¯θ2(s1).
(2) If T¯θ (s1) < 0, then θ(s1) θ¯ (s1).
(3) If T¯θ (s1) > 0, then θ(s1) θ¯ (s1).
(4) If θ(s1) > θ¯(s1), then T¯θ (s1) 0.
(5) If θ(s1) < θ¯(s1), then T¯θ (s1) 0.
Proof. (1) If θ1(s1) > θ2(s1) 0, then
θ1(s1)V (f,g)(s1) > θ2(s1)V (f,g)(s1)
since V (f,g)(s1) > 0 for all (f, g) ∈ F ×G. It follows that for all (f, g) ∈ F × G,
U(f,g)(s1) − θ1(s1)V (f,g)(s1) < U(f,g)(s1) − θ2(s1)V (f,g)(s1),
that is,
Tθ1(f, g)(s1) < Tθ2(f, g)(s1).
Hence
T¯θ1(s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ1(f, g)(s1) inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ2(f, g)(s1) = T¯θ2(s1).
(2) If T¯θ (s1) < 0, then from the definition of T¯θ (s1) there exists f¯ ∈ F such that
supg∈G Tθ(f¯ , g)(s1) < 0, that is, for any g ∈ G,
Tθ (f¯ , g)(s1) = U(f¯ , g)(s1) − θ(s1)V (f¯ , g)(s1) < 0.
It follows that
W(f¯ , g)(s1) = U(f¯ , g)(s1)
V (f¯ , g)(s1)
< θ(s1),
and so
sup W(f¯ , g)(s1) θ(s1).
g∈G
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θ¯ (s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
W(f,g)(s1) < θ(s1).
(3) If T¯θ (s1) > 0, then for any f ∈ F ,
sup
g∈G
Tθ(f, g)(s1) > 0,
and so there exists gf ∈ G depending on f , such that
Tθ (f, gf )(s1) = U(f,gf )(s1) − θ(s1)V (f,gf )(s1) > 0.
From the last inequality, we obtain
W(f,gf )(s1) = U(f,g)(s1)
V (f,g)(s1)
> θ(s1).
Hence for any f ∈ F ,
sup
g∈G
W(f,g)(s1)W(f,gf )(s1) > θ(s1).
It follows that by taking the infimum over f ∈ F we eventually obtain
θ¯ (s1) θ(s1).
(4) If θ(s1) > θ¯(s1), then by definition of θ¯ (s1) there exists f¯ ∈ F such that
θ(s1) > sup
g∈G
W(f¯ , g)(s1)
or
θ(s1) >W(f¯ , g)(s1) for all g ∈ G.
This implies that, for all g ∈ G,
Tθ (f¯ , g)(s1) = U(f¯ , g)(s1) − θ(s1)V (f¯ , g)(s1) < 0.
Hence
0 sup
g∈G
Tθ(f¯ , g)(s1) inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ(f, g)(s1) = T¯θ (s1).
(5) If θ¯ (s1) > θ(s1), then for any f ∈ F ,
sup
g∈G
W(f,g)(s1) > θ(s1).
It follows that there is gf ∈ G depending on f which satisfies
W(f,gf )(s1) > θ(s1).
This implies that Tθ (f, gf )(s1) > 0, and hence
sup
g∈G
Tθ(f, g)(s1) Tθ (f, g)(s1) > 0,
T¯θ (s1) = inf
f∈F sup Tθ (f, g)(s1) 0. g∈G
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T¯θ (s1) in the above proposition.
Proposition 3.2.
(1) If θ1(s1) > θ2(s1) 0, then T θ1(s1) T θ2(s1).(2) If T θ (s1) < 0, then θ(s1) θ(s1).
(3) If T θ (s1) > 0, then θ(s1) θ(s1).
(4) If θ(s1) > θ(s1), then T θ (s1) 0.
(5) If θ(s1) < θ(s1), then T θ (s1) 0.
Proof. Using T θ (s1) and θ(s1) instead of T¯θ (s1) and θ¯ (s1), respectively, we can prove this
proposition by similar arguments as in the previous proof. 
4. The saddle value function of the game (DFG)
Now we can prove the existence theorem for saddle value function in the game (DFG),
and the relationship between the games (DFG) and (DGPθ ).
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that g∗ ∈ G is a maximizer of the game (DFG). Then we have
(1) θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1) and
(2) if T¯θ∗(s1) 0, then g∗ is a maximizer of the game (DGPθ∗).
Proof. (1) By the definitions of θ¯ (s1) and θ(s1), we see that θ¯ (s1) θ(s1).
On the other hand, since g∗ ∈ G is a maximizer of the game (DFG), it follows that
θ¯ (s1) = inf
f∈F W(f,g
∗)(s1) sup
g∈G
inf
f∈F W(f,g)(s1) = θ(s1).
Thus, the game (DFG) has a value function, that is, θ¯ = θ on S1.
(2) Since g∗ ∈ G is a maximizer of the game (DFG), it follows that
θ∗(s1) = inf
f∈F W(f,g
∗)(s1)W(f,g∗)(s1) for all f ∈ F.
This implies that, for all f ∈ F ,
0 Tθ∗(f, g∗)(s1) sup
g∈G
Tθ∗(f, g)(s1).
Hence we get
0 inf
f∈F Tθ
∗(f, g∗)(s1) inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ∗(f, g)(s1) = T¯θ∗(s1) 0.
This shows that
inf
f∈F Tθ
∗(f, g∗)(s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ∗(f, g)(s1).
Therefore g∗ is a maximizer of the game (DGPθ∗). 
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Corollary 4.2. Suppose that (f ∗, g∗) ∈ F × G is a saddle point of the game (DFG). Then
we have
(1) Tθ∗(f ∗, g∗)(s1) = 0 and
(2) (f ∗, g∗) is a saddle point of the game (DGPθ∗).
A theorem similar to Theorem 4.1 is given as follows.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that f ∗ ∈ F is a minimizer of the game (DFG). Then we have
(1) θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1) and
(2) if T θ∗(s1) 0, then f ∗ is a minimizer of the game (DGPθ∗).
Proof. (1) Clearly, θ(s1) θ¯ (s1). On the other hand, if f ∗ ∈ F is a minimizer of the game
(DFG), then
θ(s1) = sup
g∈G
W(f ∗, g)(s1) inf
f∈F supg∈G
W(f,g)(s1) = θ¯ (s1).
This implies that θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1).
(2) Since f ∗ ∈ F is a minimizer of the game (DFG), it follows that
θ∗(s1) = sup
g∈G
W(f ∗, g)(s1)W(f ∗, g)(s1) for all g ∈ G.
This implies that
U(f ∗, g)(s1) − θ∗V (f ∗, g)(s1) 0,
0 sup
g
Tθ∗(f ∗, g)(s1) inf
f
sup
g
Tθ∗(f, g)(s1) = T θ∗(s1) 0.
Hence
sup
g∈G
T θ∗(f
∗, g)(s1) = inf
f∈F supg∈G
T θ∗(f, g)(s1) = T θ∗(s1),
and f ∗ is a minimizer of (DGPθ ). 
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1).
(1) If g∗ ∈ G is a maximizer of the game (DGPθ∗ ) with
inf
f∈F Tθ
∗(f, g∗)(s1) = T¯θ∗(s1) 0,
then g∗ is a maximizer of the game (DFG).
(2) If f ∗ ∈ F is a minimizer of (DGPθ∗) with
sup
g∈G
Tθ∗(f ∗, g)(s1) = T θ∗(s1) 0,
then f ∗ is a minimizer of the game (DFG).
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it follows that
0 inf
f∈F supg∈G
Tθ∗(f, g)(s1) = inf
f∈F Tθ
∗(f, g∗)(s1) Tθ∗(f, g∗)(s1) for all f ∈ F.
This implies that
θ∗(s1)W(f,g∗)(s1) sup
g∈G
W(f,g)(s1) for all f ∈ F.
Hence
θ∗(s1) inf
f∈F W(f,g
∗)(s1) inf
f∈F supg∈G
W(f,g)(s1) = θ¯∗(s1).
This shows that g∗ is a maximizer of the game (DFG).
(2) The proof follows the same lines as the proof given for (1). 
From Theorem 4, we easily conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that θ¯ (s1) = θ(s1) = θ∗(s1), and that (f ∗, g∗) ∈ F ×G is a saddle
point of the game (DGPθ∗) with Tθ∗(f ∗, g∗)(s1) = 0. Then (f ∗, g∗) is a saddle point of
the game (DFG).
5. A remark for further development
The objective function of a fractional dynamic game is of the form
W(x,y) = U(x,y)
V (x, y)
, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y. ()
Our problem is to show that following inf–sup problem (∗) has zero dual gap under certain
conditions. That is a minimax problem
inf
x∈X supy∈Y
W(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈XW(x,y), (∗)
where X and Y denote the universal strategy spaces in the sense of measurable transition
probabilities. If X and Y are assumed to be nondiscrete compact strategy spaces for players
I and II, then a question arises in the mathematical analysis for deterministic situations
that under what conditions on the denominator and the numerator functions, V (x, y) and
U(x,y), the fractional functional W(x,y) will have a saddle point? There are many authors
who investigated this problem deriving minimax theorems with respect to a two-variable
function in x and y; see, for example, [3,6–8]. An excellent reference paper may refer to
Fan [3] for nonfractional case. While some special minimax theorems in fractional cases,
one can consult Lai et al. [6–8], these papers in minimax fractional programming are taking
x to be discrete as counting functions of y . Further problems are implicit in the fractional
functional W(x,y).
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